Legal Alerts and Articles
FCC Initiates Inquiry into Broadband Network Failures
On April 21, 2010, the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC” or “Commission”) released a Notice of Inquiry (“NOI”) soliciting public comment on the resilience and survivability of the national broadband infrastructure in the event of attacks, natural disasters, or network overload. The Notice of Inquiry (in PDF format) can be downloaded from the FCC’s website at: http://bit.ly/cFNPCG.
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) directed the FCC to prepare a National Broadband Plan (“NBP”) and report that plan to Congress. One particular portion of the plan addressed ways in which the broadband infrastructure can “advance consumer welfare…public safety and homeland security…and other national purposes.” The objective of this FCC NOI is to, consistent with the recommendations of the NBP, enhance understanding of the present state of survivability in broadband communications networks and to explore potential measures to reduce network vulnerability to failures or severe overload conditions, such as would occur in natural disasters, pandemics, terrorist attacks and other disasters or events that would restrain communications abilities.
The Commission’s NOI acknowledges that reliance on broadband communications networks is increasing across all elements of our society and all sectors of our economy. The NOI also acknowledges that broadband core networks are generally presumed to be quite survivable.
Notwithstanding this, the NOI seeks public comment on the survivability features and risks presented by the physical architecture of current broadband communications networks. For example, what are the major single points of failure in broadband architectures (for example, edge route, gateway router, transport links, cell sites, and VoIP servers)? What are the impacts of failure of these points? What measures do communications providers take to minimize the presence of single points of failure in broadband architectures? In addition, what should the FCC’s role be in increasing the level of redundancy in broadband communications networks, taking into consideration the tradeoffs between potential regulatory burdens and the benefits of increased survivability?
The NOI also seeks comment on the risk of physical link failures along with the resulting risk of redundancy failures in broadband communications networks. According to the Commission, “[w]e are concerned that the level of redundancy and effectiveness of that redundancy in routing around failures may be inadequate in broadband communications networks.” The NOI seeks comment, for example, as to what extent core and edge network links are protected with “dark” backup links. The NOI asks as to whether there are instances where backup circuit paths occupy the same physical link as the primary circuit path. Further, the NOI asks how the FCC can enhance the chances that redundancy works in broadband communications networks without unduly burdening network operators. While the NBP recommends that any plan ensure that broadband satellite service is a part of any emergency preparedness program, the NOI does not specifically acknowledge this point.
Finally, the NOI seeks comment on the ability of broadband access networks (i.e., cable, DSL, fiber to the home, etc.) to maintain effective operation during severe network congestion or overload. In this regard, the Commission notes that “[l]arge-scale events such as pandemics or bioterror attacks may cause dramatic changes in broadband usage patterns as traffic that is ordinarily confined within enterprise or academic networks or passed between enterprise-grade access networks suddenly shifts onto residential-access networks.” In addition, the NOI asks whether there is a need for ways to prioritize broadband traffic during emergencies.
Initial comments on the NOI are due within 45 days from its publication in the Federal Register and reply comments are due within 75 days from publication in the Register.
The ability of broadband communications networks to sustain failure of network equipment or severe overload is a critical national priority. It affects not only federal, state, and local governments, but also providers which support public safety communications as well as the insular areas and Tribal nations.
If you have questions or are interested in submitting comments, please feel free to contact us.
April 2010